Chancellor Olaf Scholz called the Russian invasion of Ukraine an act of “brutal aggression,” in a recent DW interview, stressing that “this is imperialism. And we will never accept that.” Internationally, he said, it was now a matter of showing that “there must never again be a successful attempt to move borders by force.”
According to the German government, the way to achieve this is through ever tougher sanctions against Russia, cutting Russian gas and oil supplies as quickly as possible, and military and financial aid for Ukraine. But Germany will not, Berlin has stressed, make any solo moves and risk becoming an actual party to the war.
Foreign policy expert Johannes Varwick of the University of Halle describes the German government’s strategy as an attempt to simply “follow its partners’ lead.” It “does not set a course of its own, at least publicly, but for the most part, rather hesitantly carries out what allies have already done (such as embargos and arms deliveries).”
Slow to fulfill promises
Shortly after the Russian offensive began, Germany agreed to send arms to Ukraine. Since March, the Ukrainian armed forces have received thousands of anti-tank weapons and anti-tank mines, surface-to-air missiles, hand grenades and ammunition from Bundeswehr stocks.
The German government then promised that it would supply NATO partners who are sending their own Russian-made heavy weapons to Ukraine with corresponding Western-made equipment as replacements. However, there are conflicting reports as to whether this has actually happened yet.
At the end of April, Germany’s parliament, the Bundestag, agreed to send heavy weapons to Ukraine. Despite the decision, the proposed delivery has been delayed for a host of reasons, including a lack of ammunition for the promised Gepard anti-aircraft tanks, long since decommissioned in Germany. Last week, the Defense Ministry announced the first 15 Gepard tanks would be delivered in mid-July, with another 15 by the end of August.
Germany has, however, pledged billions in aid to Ukraine directly and also through the EU. Germany provides about one-third of the EU member states’ fund for financing military equipment for Ukraine’s armed forces. The Kiel Institute for World Economy is tracking financial, humanitarian, and military support for Ukraine on its website.
Continuous criticism
Chancellor Scholz has been perceived both at home and abroad as too timid and indecisive with regard to Ukraine.
Andrey Melnyk, the Ukrainian ambassador to Berlin, has been one of Scholz’s most vocal critics, slamming the chancellor for weeks with a force that no diplomat has ever attacked a German head of government before. A few days ago, Melnyk spoke with the media group Redaktionsnetzwerk Deutschland, expressing the suspicion that Scholz in fact does not want to deliver heavy weapons, and is stalling “until there is a ceasefire. Then the pressure will be off Germany and then there will be no need to make any more courageous decisions.”
Johannes Varwick took a more generous view, describing Scholz as “one of those level-headed voices who, on the one hand, leave no doubt about solidarity with Ukraine, but on the other hand – and not out of cowardice or incompetence, but because the government doesn’t want to be too involved in the war – and also seems to consider possible side effects and risks of arms deliveries and is not a hothead.”
But even joint action with other European leaders is met with skepticism. Last Saturday’s telephone conversation between Vladimir Putin, Olaf Scholz, and Emmanuel Macron about a possible peace agreement was questioned in London’s Telegraph newspaper this Monday: “A negotiated settlement of the type being sought by the French and German leaders implies the surrender of territory by Ukraine. […] There is also a risk that Macron and Scholz will undermine the notion of Western solidarity by embarking on their own initiatives. Inevitably, there is a suspicion that they want this conflict to end for their own benefit, not Ukraine’s.”
The unintended consequences of sanctions
Putin has responded to Western sanctions in a number of ways, that have come together to increase fuel and food prices.
Many developing nations, particularly in Africa, rely on Ukrainian food imports to feed their population. What is already significantly reducing the purchasing power of average families in Germany threatens to turn into famine in several African countries.
Chancellor Scholz promised the affected countries economic aid. However, he rejected the idea of introducing subsidies that would absorb such price increases worldwide.
“We have to start increasing the supply of gas and fuel,” he said. “We’re trying to get oil- and gas-producing countries to increase production, and that would take pressure off the world market.”
In South Africa, the last leg of Scholz’s Africa tour, however, he had to learn that his Ukraine-Russia strategy was not shared by everyone. South Africa is a member of the BRICS alliance along with China, Russia, Brazil, and India and is refusing to adopt a harsh line of Moscow. Shortly after the war began, five countries voted against a UN resolution condemning the Russian invasion. 35 states abstained, including 17 African countries.
Little room for negotiation
Olaf Scholz also appealed to Russia’s and Putin’s self-interest during his DW interview: “The war will never end well for his country.” As a result of the sanctions, “the Russian economy will be set back decades.” For that reason alone, he said, Putin should end the war.
But despite setbacks, Russia has continued its offensive in eastern and southern Ukraine. On the other hand, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is now demanding that Russia give up all Ukrainian territories occupied in violation of international law, which includes Crimea, annexed in 2014, something Russia has ruled out entirely. As things stand, the chance for peace negotiations appears to be zero.
Germany seems unwilling to push Zelenskyy towards making concessions. A government spokeswoman in Berlin said last week that it is Ukraine’s decision alone to decide under what conditions it wants to make peace.
Foreign policy expert Varwick believes it would be “a grave mistake to tie ourselves too closely to Ukrainian goals. We certainly have other interests than Ukraine, such as avoiding a direct war with Russia, into which Ukraine could like to drag us because of its understandable interests. We should avoid that at all costs.” He said it should not be taboo to “put pressure also on Ukraine to agree to a political compromise solution with Russia (…) even if that means losing part of its territory. For the time being, this is better than a permanent escalation with an incalculable outcome.”
If Ukrainian peace terms are unrealistically high and Russia continues to fight, Ukraine could face a long war of attrition, Varwick warned.
And that could mean Kyiv’s allies could have to continue supporting the country with money, weapons, and refugee assistance for a long time. If so, Western allies could find themselves in a similar position to the one in which they found themselves with regard to Afghanistan. There could be years of financial, military, and humanitarian involvement with no existing scenario and no foreseeable end.
This article was originally written in German.
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Article source: https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-what-is-germany-s-strategy/a-61977500?maca=en-rss-en-ger-1023-xml-atom