How Stable Is Germany’s New Coalition?: The First Fractures Become Apparent in Berlin
Soon after the talks began, the Green negotiators realized that the SPD would by no means be their natural ally and that it was in part fighting with the FDP against the Greens’ interests. That proved to be the case in the working group on the economy, where the FDP and the Social Democrats wanted to finally ratify the CETA free trade agreement between the EU and Canada. The Greens reject the agreement’s provision on arbitration courts. Now, the Federal Constitutional Court is to decide, meaning the conflict has been postponed.
The talks were tough, though, and the Greens soon got fed up, and frustration and fatigue grew. At one point during an internal Green Party conference call, someone could even be heard snoring.
At the same time, the Greens have chalked up some other successes that go beyond climate policy. Germany’s citizenship laws are to be reformed, “advertising” for abortions will no longer be prohibited and a moratorium has been placed on sanctions that can currently be slapped on people who receive Germany’s long-term “Hartz IV” welfare payments. However, the FDP also wanted a lot of these things and the Greens are lacking the big trophies to give their party a higher profile. Habeck himself, for example, is even wondering himself whether he gave up too quickly on the Greens’ call for a firm speed limit of 120 kilometers per hour to be imposed on all German highways.
The disappointment in the party can’t be ignored, and the negotiators were apparently already reckoning with this – at least this is suggested by an email sent out to Green Party members of the European Parliament on Wednesday morning. Michael Kellner, a high-level official in the national party and party co-head Annalena Baerbock asked them in a letter to express their “pleasure publicly” that the Greens would be allowed to nominate the next German European Commissioner. But the success they are supposed to be cheering might not even happen. If Ursula von der Leyen remains the European Commission president after the European elections in two and a half years, then there will be no German post to fill. A Green Party source in Brussels says: “The party leadership probably wants, most of all, to dampen the discontent over the fact that we didn’t get the Transport Ministry.”
The Greens’ Successes Are Primarily Declarations of Intent
Just how difficult the Greens had it in the negotiations is also visible in another chapter of the coalition agreement: foreign policy. Here, too, they had to relent on some essential points.
For years, the environmentalist party has been fighting against the official NATO target that member states should spend 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense. Under the contract, the coalition partners do not explicitly commit themselves to that target, but they do so in a de facto way. The agreement states that Germany wants to “fulfil the obligations it has entered into with NATO.”
Under the agreement, the partners also commit themselves to German participation in nuclear deterrence, known in NATO parlance as nuclear sharing. As before, it remains possible that in a worst-case scenario, German fighter jets could be forced to drop American nuclear bombs.
One section that does have the Greens’ handwriting on it, though, is the one on EU policy. It speaks of a “federal European state,” an amendment to the EU treaties, a new European constitution and a “genuine EU foreign minister.” There’s just one hitch: How is this all going to be implemented in a deeply divided Europe?
In fact, the Greens’ successes are primarily declarations of intent. Foreign Minister-designate Baerbock is likely to repeat them like mantras over the next four years. But the most contentious point of European policy, which both the Greens and the SPD repeatedly demanded during the election campaign, doesn’t even appear in the coalition agreement: the issuance of EU bonds, with joint liability for them across the bloc.
Baerbock didn’t fare nearly as well as hoped in the national election and she was forced to cede the role of vice chancellor to Habeck. For election winner Scholz, on the other hand, the coalition negotiations were also a success, at least to a large extent.
Scholz was able to push through the minimum wage, a change to the social safety net that would allow the pension system to invest part of its money in capital markets and significant changes to the country’s long-term welfare program. In addition to the Chancellery, the SPD will also be in charge of key ministries like labor, interior and defense. There is little criticism within the SPD. The party has spent years quarreling internally, but that is barely visible now.
Scholz also managed to win the respect of his future coalition partners. People inside the FDP, in particular, were impressed by the depth of his knowledge of the issues involved in the negotiations. Scholz had been the first to read the draft agreement from cover to cover and to be able to quote from memory what had been written at the bottom of page 80. The future chancellor, at times, seemed like the class nerd.
But Scholz, as serious as he may appear, isn’t much less vain than Habeck and Lindner. The only thing he cares less about than the other two is his hairstyle, because he doesn’t have much of it.
Overall, Scholz’s leadership style is more reminiscent of Angela Merkel than her predecessor Gerhard Schröder. “Scholz played the role of moderator, taking in what others were saying,” says one negotiator, Adding that he hadn’t been too dominant and left room for the others. He wasn’t like, “this is it, period!” says on FDP source.
The chancellor-designate treated all participants equally, says one source who was present. He says that Scholz listened to all the arguments and then sought a solution, although some couldn’t shake off the impression that he was someone more sympathetic to the red lines drawn by the market-oriented FDP than those of the Greens.